It is the accepted wisdom that the struggle in Iraq cannot be won by military means. This may be true; however, we don’t know the accuracy of the statement because we have not tried military means to win it.

Part of the problem is that the upper echelon of the military has no experience with waging total war to absolute victory. No one is left over from the World War II era in which the goal was to total victory, which meant killing as many of the enemy as quickly as possible, and the destruction of the support systems which sustained him in the field. Today’s three and four star generals came of age during a period in which the United States has deliberately restrained the use of its power in fighting and settled for outcomes short of victory and even defeat. Beginning with Korea, continuing with Vietnam, and in virtually every venue the military has been deployed in anger since, the ultimate military objective has never been the total expiration of the enemy and all that sustains him. As a consequence, the generals in the Pentagon today have never planned a conflict in which total victory was the goal.

As the military has become less a force to kill people and destroy things, the natural evolution is for officers to replace an emphasis on aggression and war-making with the political arts needed to foster upward promotion, budget enhancement, and political approval. Taking risks is discouraged; consultation with the military attorney in the Judge Advocate General’s office is encouraged. An overemphasis is placed on technology and exotic weapons. A new orthodoxy takes hold, in which victory becomes a flexible concept incorporating outcomes short of defeating the enemy. Involvement in regions or conflicts requiring close combat with the enemy and the inevitable casualties of such conflict are to be avoided at all costs.

A new mind-set is needed in upper command of the military. The idea that war can be relatively bloodless, that its costs in the death of innocents or in damage to property can be limited, is fatuous. Not only is it fatuous, but as regards the jihadist enemy, which makes its home among the population and draws some support from the natives, the idea is a prescription for defeat. This enemy and his support systems must be killed where found, without undue worry about collateral damage. Apologies and compensation can be made after victory is won. A war against terrorists cannot be won if commanders’ first inclination is to consult with the JAG corps.

Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan would know what to do about the insurgents in Iraq, as would George Patton or Douglas MacArthur. Each understood that in war killing the enemy and destroying his will and ability to fight was the first and foremost objective, and the morality of the means is measured by the consequences of victory or defeat. During World War II, the Allies did not hesitate to level the enemies’ cities and devastate his civilian population in the belief that doing so would hasten the day that victory was won. The United States atomized two Japanese cities to win the war. These actions were justified because, as terrible as the actions were, it was essential to win the war to preserve the nation. Does anyone argue that an Axis victory was preferable?

The stakes in Iraq are almost as high. The consequences of an American victory in Iraq are immeasurably superior to any other alternative, not only for the United States but also for the entire Middle East. An American defeat will propel the enemy, the apostles of seventh century barbarism, to advance on all fronts, in Africa, Europe and Asia, and assuredly, North America. There is no negotiation or appeasement of this enemy. There is no modus vivendi to be reached with him or his religion. The American military, the American political class and the American people must relearn what are forefathers understood, that when the choice is between survival of our children and our way of life or subjugation, what is morally appropriate is victory, and all that is necessary to achieve that end.